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ESXi Can Write Its Logs to a RAM Disk. Ransomware Counts on It

On an ESXi host without persistent scratch, /var/run/log lives on an in-memory ramdisk and evaporates at the next boot. Ransomware crews get the same effect for free — they power off, kill, or reboot the workloads before encrypting — which means your entire forensic timeline had to be forwarded off-box before the incident or it never existed at all.

ESXi Forensics and the RAMdisk Logging Gap Nobody Configured Around

On ESXi the logs that explain how an intruder got root are written to a ramdisk that a reboot erases. Here is where the evidence actually lives, what to detect before it’s gone, and how it maps to the audit-storage controls the architecture violates by default.

Token replay forensics: reconstructing a post-MFA compromise in Entra ID

When MFA held and the attacker still got in, the evidence lives in session token reuse, not failed logins. A defender’s view of reconstructing a stolen-session timeline in Entra ID — what survives, what to query, and where the false positives come from.

Salt Typhoon and the Carrier Trust Collapse: A Defender’s Field Guide

Chinese state actors have been inside major U.S. carrier networks for months to years. Here is what enterprise defenders should actually do about it — detection logic, SIEM specifics, and the control updates that matter.

Cyber Tools

Defender’s Auto-Isolate Preview: What Changes When ‘Contain’ Becomes ‘Isolate’

Microsoft Defender’s new Preview adds automatic Isolate device to the attack disruption stack — distinct from the Device contain action that’s been auto-firing since 2023. The distinction matters operationally. So does Microsoft’s stated 99%+ confidence threshold, the 3-day offline retry window, the workstation-only scope, and the exclusion model defenders need to wire up before flipping this on.

Cyber Tools

ToolShell six months on: SharePoint on-prem detection that holds up in the index

A defender-oriented look at the SharePoint ToolShell chain (CVE-2025-53770 / 53771) — what the telemetry actually looks like in a real SIEM, where the first round of tuning breaks, and which assumptions about your SharePoint farm change the answer.

Token theft DFIR in Entra ID after the device-bound credential rollout

Token Protection and DBSC closed some doors in 2026 but left the SOC with a messier detection surface than the vendor decks suggest. Here is what the incident actually looks like in the SIEM, where the first round of tuning has to land, and what most teams get wrong on revocation.

Cyber Tools

Operation Saffron and the End of First VPN: Pre-Positioning Was the Whole Move

First VPN — 1vpns.com, twelve years old, 5,000 accounts, the bulletproof VPN that ‘wouldn’t fall under any jurisdiction’ — is offline as of May 20. The story isn’t the seizure. It’s that Europol was already inside the infrastructure before the takedown, walking out with the user database. That changes the threat model for every successor service still running.

Token theft after AitM phishing in Entra ID: what the SignInLogs actually show in 2026

A defender-oriented walkthrough of investigating adversary-in-the-middle token theft against Entra ID now that token protection, CAE, and device-bound sessions are widely on — what the logs actually contain, what the first detection misses, and where the artifacts live outside Entra.

Cyber Tools

ClickFix Detection Without the Fairy Tale

ClickFix initial access has been pasting PowerShell into RunMRU for two years and most detection content still treats it like a primer. Here is what the telemetry actually looks like, what tunes out, and where teams keep getting it wrong.