The landing site for Trackr Services
Indirect prompt injection is hard to catch in the prompt and easy to miss in the model output. The reliable detection surface is the outbound fetch the rendered answer triggers — here is how to instrument it and where the false positives come from.
Bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver EDR killers are a standard stage in ransomware intrusions now, not an exotic capability. The driver blocklist is the weakest control you have against them. Here is what to instrument instead.
An MCP server you approved last week can mutate its tool descriptions tonight, and most clients won’t tell you. Here’s how the rug pull works, what to log, and what the detection actually looks like before the false positives bury it.
A clean netstat is not proof of safety: eBPF backdoors like LinkPro keep an internal listener, rewrite ports through XDP/TC, and can make bpftool lie about themselves. The durable signal is the bpf() syscall at load time, and on Cilium-heavy fleets, telling real loaders from noise is most of the work.
Nation-state operators now rent disposable relay meshes that cycle IPs faster than your threat feed updates. Indicator-based blocking was already brittle; against ORB networks it’s mostly theater. Here’s what actually moves the needle.
Short-lived OIDC federation from GitHub Actions to cloud IAM roles is the right pattern — and the trust policy condition is exactly where it goes wrong. What the abuse looks like in CloudTrail, why the obvious detection doesn’t fire, and what the first round of tuning has to fix.
Bootc and rpm-ostree turn the root filesystem read-only and push state into a handful of writable paths. That quietly invalidates half your host integrity detections. Here is the new shape of the problem and what to instrument before the first ATO review notices.
Two separate disclosures against Anthropic’s Claude Code GitHub Action show how a single opened issue can walk out with OIDC tokens and an unscrubbed API key. Neither got a CVE, which is its own problem.
CVE-2025-29927 let attackers skip Next.js middleware entirely with a single request header, including the middleware doing your auth. The detection is trivial once you capture the field — and the architecture mistake underneath it is the part worth your attention.
Adversary-in-the-middle kits steal the session token after MFA succeeds, then replay it from somewhere else. Here is how the replay actually looks in your sign-in logs, why token protection only half-closes the gap, and where it maps to 800-53.
