SR – Trackr.Live

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An Unreviewed Terraform Plan Can Execute Contributor-Controlled Code. The External Data Source Runs During Planning, Not Only Apply

When a CI workflow auto-plans a contributor’s pull request in a privileged context, a data source can execute on the runner the moment terraform plan runs — before anyone reads the diff. Here is what that actually exposes, where the detection really lives, and why the process tree is a grandchild deep.

A Fork PR Poisoned the pnpm Cache Your Release Workflow Trusted, and GitHub’s Audit Log Never Logged the Write

The TanStack compromise published 84 poisoned npm versions across 42 packages by writing a cache entry into the default-branch scope from an untrusted fork PR. GitHub has since made that write path read-only for low-trust triggers — but cache creation still never touches the audit log, so post-hoc detection has to live on the runner and in cache-inventory differencing instead.

Cyber Tools

GitHub Logs the Workflow Run, Not the Cache Write. That’s the Gap Cache Poisoning Lives In

The 2026 TanStack compromise (CVE-2026-45321) turned a bundle-size workflow into an npm publishing channel by poisoning a repo-scoped cache. The cache write left almost no runtime telemetry, which makes this a config audit before it’s ever a detection.

Cyber Tools

Atomic Arch: When “Abandoned but Trusted” Becomes the Attack Surface

The June 2026 Atomic Arch campaign weaponized abandoned AUR packages with a Rust infostealer and an eBPF rootkit. The mechanism wasn’t an exploit — it was the orphan-adoption process working exactly as designed.

Artificial Intelligence

Detecting MCP Rug Pulls When an Approved Tool Rewrites Its Own Description

An MCP server you approved last week can mutate its tool descriptions tonight, and most clients won’t tell you. Here’s how the rug pull works, what to log, and what the detection actually looks like before the false positives bury it.

OIDC trust policies are the CI/CD attack surface nobody is watching

Short-lived OIDC federation from GitHub Actions to cloud IAM roles is the right pattern — and the trust policy condition is exactly where it goes wrong. What the abuse looks like in CloudTrail, why the obvious detection doesn’t fire, and what the first round of tuning has to fix.

Cyber Tools

One GitHub Issue, Production Credentials: The Claude Code Action Injection Chain

Two separate disclosures against Anthropic’s Claude Code GitHub Action show how a single opened issue can walk out with OIDC tokens and an unscrubbed API key. Neither got a CVE, which is its own problem.

Cyber Tools

Miasma in the @redhat-cloud-services npm scope: a worm with valid provenance

A self-propagating npm worm poisoned 32 @redhat-cloud-services packages on June 1, 2026 — and because it published through Red Hat’s own OIDC pipeline, the malicious versions carried legitimate SLSA provenance. Here’s the scope, the mechanism, and the rotation list.

Cyber Tools

TeamPCP Claims a 4,000-Repo GitHub Source Code Sale: What Goes in the Verification Column, and What You Actually Patch Around

TeamPCP — the supply-chain crew behind the Trivy / Checkmarx / KICS / LiteLLM compromises and the Shai-Hulud worm — surfaced a sale listing on May 19, 2026 claiming roughly 4,000 GitHub private repositories of internal source code. The claim is pending verification, the ESIX score is 7.96, and the group’s track record is exactly the mix of ‘demonstrably capable’ and ‘inclined to repackage’ that makes this kind of listing operationally annoying. Here’s the read.

Cyber Tools

Mini Shai-Hulud and the Collapse of Software Provenance Trust

The uncomfortable part about Mini Shai-Hulud is not the malware itself. Credential stealers are everywhere. Obfuscated JavaScript loaders in npm packages are not exactly new territory either. The problem is that this thing successfully rode through trusted publishing infrastructure and valid provenance paths, which means a lot of the security plumbing people have been congratulating …