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Control

AU

Scratch on a Ramdisk: The ESXi Default That Decides Your Timeline

On an ESXi host without persistent scratch, /var/run/log lives on an in-memory ramdisk and evaporates at the next boot. Ransomware crews get the same effect for free — they power off, kill, or reboot the workloads before encrypting — which means your entire forensic timeline had to be forwarded off-box before the incident or it never existed at all.

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AC

Entra Logs a Federated Credential Add as Update Application

Most SOCs detect service principal persistence by watching for “Add service principal credentials.” Federated identity credentials reach the same persistence with a different audit operation, on a different object, sometimes in a log source you never ingested.

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AC

ESC16 Strips the SID Extension Strong Mapping Depends On

Microsoft’s strong certificate mapping enforcement finally landed, and where it’s genuinely in force it does close the naive implicit-mapping hole that made ADCS escalation trivial — a certificate with only a weak name is denied. ESC16 strips the CA-issued SID so the mapping decision falls to whatever’s left: on a compatibility-mode DC that’s weak SAN mapping, and even on a fully-enforced DC it’s an attacker-supplied SID-in-SAN URI the KDC treats as strong. The audit events you’d hunt it with are off by default.

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CM

A .NET App Config Can Disable the Runtime’s ETW Provider

AppDomainManager hijacking loads attacker code into a Microsoft-signed .NET process before the app runs — and the same config file that does it can switch off the ETW telemetry your EDR depends on. The cleanest detection isn’t the dropped DLL. It’s the XML.

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