Immutable base images plus systemd sysext/confext overlays have quietly become the standard for fleet-managed Linux in 2026. They also created a persistence surface most SOCs are not yet watching.
A double-free in Apache httpd 2.4.66’s mod_http2 lets unauthenticated clients crash workers reliably and, on certain builds, opens a path to remote code execution. Here’s the defender-oriented breakdown: mechanism, detection, remediation, and 800-53 mapping.
Model Context Protocol turned every internal API into an LLM-reachable tool. The threat model didn’t catch up. Here’s what tool poisoning looks like in production and how to harden against it.
Model Context Protocol turned every developer’s laptop into a tool-calling agent host. The trust model that came with it is closer to npm circa 2016 than to anything a serious authorizing official would sign.
Trellix has confirmed unauthorized access to part of its source code repository. The disclosure is thin on detail and heavy on implications for every shop running Trellix EDR or XDR.
Theori’s Copy Fail flaw turns a nine-year-old in-place optimization in the kernel’s AEAD socket layer into a deterministic 4-byte page-cache write. No race, no offset hunting, no per-distro tuning. A 732-byte Python script edits a setuid binary’s cached pages and hands you root on Ubuntu, RHEL, SUSE, and Amazon Linux without modification.
Indirect prompt injection has graduated from a research curiosity to a routine cause of agent compromise. Here is what defenders are actually shipping in 2026, and where the control gaps still are.
A remote, unauthenticated heap use-after-free in OpenWidget 3.0.0–3.2.1 hands attackers code execution against ~14,200 internet-exposed instances. Here is the triage order defenders should be working through right now.
Wiz Research disclosed a command injection in GitHub’s internal git pipeline that let any authenticated user reach RCE with a single git push. The root cause is the same one that has burned multi-service architectures for thirty years: trust boundaries that don’t actually exist.
A practitioner’s view of the realistic container escape surface in multi-tenant Kubernetes — kernel boundaries, runtime gaps, and the controls that actually move the needle.
