Conditional Access Token Protection is the control everyone cites as the answer to adversary-in-the-middle phishing. It binds the PRT for native apps on Windows and skips browsers entirely — which is exactly where the stolen cookie lands. Detection, not the control, is still your line.
FortiBleed isn’t a Fortinet vulnerability — it’s years of leaked configs, infostealer logs, and legacy password hashing compounding into tens of thousands of working FortiGate logins. There’s nothing to patch. Here’s what that changes for detection and response.
An attacker with app-management rights doesn’t need another password. They add their own secret to a trusted service principal and authenticate as the app, outside MFA and outside Conditional Access. Here is what the audit event looks like, what the first round of tuning has to fix, and where the cleanest preventive control hides behind a SKU you probably didn’t buy.
Device code phishing produces a clean, MFA-satisfied sign-in on Microsoft’s own infrastructure — and most of the telemetry that betrays it sits in the Entra non-interactive log table teams drop to save money. Here’s where the detection actually lives, how the threshold flips between a Windows shop and a dev-heavy tenant, and the persistence artifacts the closeout always skips.
Encryption-type detancy deton Kerberos TGS requests still catches lazy roasting, but as RC4 gets disabled the durable signal moves to behavior. What to grep for, why the AES downgrade tell degrades, and how to kill service-account false positives before they bury the SOC.
Adversary-in-the-middle kits steal the session token after MFA succeeds, then replay it from somewhere else. Here is how the replay actually looks in your sign-in logs, why token protection only half-closes the gap, and where it maps to 800-53.
When MFA held and the attacker still got in, the evidence lives in session token reuse, not failed logins. A defender’s view of reconstructing a stolen-session timeline in Entra ID — what survives, what to query, and where the false positives come from.
System-preferred authentication is moving to the first factor, the password prompt is about to vanish for passkey holders, and break-glass accounts are not exempt from mandatory MFA. Here’s what that actually changes for Entra defenders and home users.
Chinese state actors have been inside major U.S. carrier networks for months to years. Here is what enterprise defenders should actually do about it — detection logic, SIEM specifics, and the control updates that matter.
Continuous Access Evaluation and Device Bound Session Credentials closed some of the AitM gap, but session token theft against Entra ID is still the dominant identity attack and most of the detection burden still falls on the SOC. Here is the shape of the problem and where the first round of tuning has to land.
