Device code phishing doesn’t defeat MFA — it redirects a legitimately MFA-completed sign-in — and the naive detection drowns in legitimate CLI traffic. The durable signal is the Authentication Broker redemption and the device registration that follows, and the real fix is a Conditional Access authentication-flows block.
Most SOCs detect service principal persistence by watching for “Add service principal credentials.” Federated identity credentials reach the same persistence with a different audit operation, on a different object, sometimes in a log source you never ingested.
Microsoft’s strong certificate mapping enforcement finally landed, and where it’s genuinely in force it does close the naive implicit-mapping hole that made ADCS escalation trivial — a certificate with only a weak name is denied. ESC16 strips the CA-issued SID so the mapping decision falls to whatever’s left: on a compatibility-mode DC that’s weak SAN mapping, and even on a fully-enforced DC it’s an attacker-supplied SID-in-SAN URI the KDC treats as strong. The audit events you’d hunt it with are off by default.
Conditional Access Token Protection is the control everyone cites as the answer to adversary-in-the-middle phishing. It binds the PRT for native apps on Windows and skips browsers entirely — which is exactly where the stolen cookie lands. Detection, not the control, is still your line.
FortiBleed isn’t a Fortinet vulnerability — it’s years of leaked configs, infostealer logs, and legacy password hashing compounding into tens of thousands of working FortiGate logins. There’s nothing to patch. Here’s what that changes for detection and response.
Keyless OIDC federation killed long-lived AWS keys in CI, but it moved the trust boundary into a JSON condition block most teams wrote once and never reread. Here is where the sub-claim hole lives, what CloudTrail can and can’t tell you, and why this is a configuration audit before it is ever a detection.
CVE-2025-32463 lets any local user reach root through sudo’s chroot option, and it patches in an afternoon. The detection most teams wrote for it alerts on the wrong binary — here’s the field to key on and the false positives that flood you first.
Ubuntu 24.04 enabled AppArmor mediation of unprivileged user namespaces by default, then Qualys published three ways around it. Here’s what the control actually stops, the audit chain that proves it fired, and how to detect abuse without flooding the SOC.
An attacker with app-management rights doesn’t need another password. They add their own secret to a trusted service principal and authenticate as the app, outside MFA and outside Conditional Access. Here is what the audit event looks like, what the first round of tuning has to fix, and where the cleanest preventive control hides behind a SKU you probably didn’t buy.
GTG-1002 showed an AI agent running recon through exfiltration at machine speed across roughly 30 targets. A blue-team analysis of the behavioral tells, the identity and SIEM signals that expose autonomous operations, how to break the adversary’s loop, and where defensive AI agents help versus where the human-in-the-loop line stays.
